Optimizing the Social Cost of Congestion Games by Imposing Variable
  Delays by Díaz, Josep et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
40
6.
51
53
v1
  [
cs
.G
T]
  1
9 J
un
 20
14
Optimizing the Social Cost of Congestion Games
by Imposing Variable Delays
Josep Dı´az1, Ioannis Giotis1,2, Lefteris Kirousis3, Yiannis Mourtos2, and
Maria J. Serna1
1 Departament de Llenguatges i Sistemes Informa`tics
Universitat Polite`cnica de Catalunya, Barcelona
2 Department of Management Science and Technology
Athens University of Economics and Business, Greece
3 Department of Mathematics, National & Kapodistrian University of Athens, Greece
and Computer Technology Institute & Press “Diophantus”, Patras, Greece
Abstract. We describe a new coordination mechanism for non-atomic
congestion games that leads to a (selfish) social cost which is arbitrarily
close to the non-selfish optimal. This mechanism does not incur any
additional extra cost, like tolls, which are usually differentiated from the
social cost as expressed in terms of delays only.
1 Introduction
Selfish behavior is one of the primary reasons many systems with multiple agents
deviate from desirable outcomes. Allowing players to prioritize solely their own
benefit can lead to social inefficiency, even in outcomes where no one is better
off, compared to an optimal solution yet the social welfare is greatly diminished.
This type of behavior has been analyzed in various contexts and has often
been verified in practice. A key such area is transportation and network rout-
ing where selfish selection among possible routes can lead to congestion with
accompanying economical and environmental issues.
There exists a great amount of literature trying to address this problem both
on the basis of theoretical analysis and in practice. A standard and reasonable
modeling assumption is that all users choosing to use a particular road experience
the same amount of latency. Then, the outcome is typically evaluated against the
optimal social welfare outcome which minimizes the average latency the users
experience.
Various approaches have been proposed to steer the selfishly constructed
outcome towards optimal social welfare. The main idea is usually to incentivize
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the users to alter their selections to better ones, typically through the use of
tolls or similar measures.
We propose an alternative approach that alters the way users experience
latency and can offer significant improvements on average latency. Instead of all
users experiencing the same latency, as if everyone rushing to use the road at the
same time, we propose to implement variable latencies through a prioritization
scheme. Some users will experience smaller latency than before, while others will
experience longer latencies. We show that our system, if users behave selfishly
as expected, achieves approximately the optimal social welfare.
It is important to note that our system’s average latency on each road closely
matches the road’s average latency without the system in place, hence our system
falls under the notion of coordination mechanisms and we have not “cheated”
by decreasing latencies or imposing tolls; we are simply distributing the resource
differently. This holds on any instance, not just equilibrium settings, which means
that even non stable situations we do not get worse performance. Furthermore,
we do not need to know the demand in advance, i.e. our system delivers the social
optimum for all possible total amounts of traffic. Our only requirement is that
the latency induced on each road is a non-negative, non-decreasing, continuously
differentiable and convex function of the traffic.
We believe our system has basis for practical implementation. For exam-
ple, some countries have already implemented metered highway entrance ramps
which can vary the latency of incoming drivers. Traffic signals can also be used in
an urban environment to implement this aspect of our mechanism. We deliber-
ately leave the prioritization scheme generic to allow for different such approaches
with our only requirement being that users choosing to alter their current selec-
tion are forced to experience maximal latency in their new selection, a reasonable
requirement as typically someone that alters their selection in a running system
ends up at the end of a queue.
We examine our system in the generic scheme of congestion games. As such,
it can have other application besides traffic routing. One interesting application
could be in the context of job scheduling. Again, in a typical model, each user
choosing to use a particular resource experiences the same latency, for example
computing jobs running in parallel on a computer. By prioritizing jobs according
to our proposed mechanism such that some jobs complete faster and some slower
than before we can achieve optimal average job completion times under selfish
behavior. We note that this can be easily implemented by an administrator using
system priorities.
2 Related work
The fact that selfish behavior can lead to inefficiency has been long studied
in the context of transportation theory [8,11]. More recently, Koutsoupias and
Papadimitriou introduced the Price of Anarchy as a measure of this ineffi-
ciency [6,7]. Exploration of this metric in the context of selfish routing was
then greatly progressed by Roughgarden and Tardos [10,9] which bounded the
price of anarchy for different classes of latency functions.
Naturally, ways to improve inefficient outcomes were investigated, with a
prime example being the imposement of tolls [3,4,5]. While this approach achieves
optimal social welfare regarding latencies, it introduces a cost separation to the
players as the tolls’ cost is affecting behavior but is not accounted for in the
objective function.
Coordination mechanisms were introduced by Christodoulou et al. [1] as a
way to “shape” latency functions to steer the selfishly dictated outcome towards
greater social welfare. There are two main restrictions in a coordination mech-
anism as defined in [1], first the latency on each resource is not reduced and
secondly the benchmark optimal social welfare is still the one without any ad-
ditional latencies the coordination mechanism may impose. It has been recently
shown that indeed such mechanisms can positively affect social welfare [2]. In
this work, the non-decreasing of the latency is respected not for every unit but
on the average.
3 Model
We define a congestion game (E, l,S, d) in the generic sense but using network
routing terminology for convenience. First, a set E of edges with an associated
non-negative, non-decreasing, continuously differentiable and convex le(xe) la-
tency function for each edge. We note that these assumptions are typical for
latency functions. We have n player types 1, 2, . . . , k, and for each player type i
there is a finite multiset Si of subsets of E, called the strategy set of players of
type i. A particular element S ∈ Si is a single strategy of player type i. We also
have a demand di for each player type i.
We assume that player types are non-atomic, i.e. they consist of infinitely
small users or infinitely divisible traffic. Let xSi denote a nonnegative real rep-
resenting the amount of players of type i that use strategy S and xi the vector
for the strategy set Si. The vector x for all xi’s is called a flow if for all player
types i,
∑
S∈Si
xSi = di. Overloading notation, we define the amount of players
of type i having flow through edge e,
xie =
∑
{S:S∈Si,e∈S}
xSi ,
and the total flow through an edge e as
xe =
∑
i=1...n
xie.
In related literature, the cost induced to each player type i by a flow x is
the sum of latencies of edges used by all players of the specific type, ci(x) =∑
e∈E le(xe) · x
i
e. The social cost is
C(x) =
∑
e∈E
le(xe) · xe.
For reference, we also note the Wardrop equilibrium in our setting.
Definition 1. We say that the flow vector x is in Wardrop equilibrium if for
all players’ type i and for any pairs of strategies (paths) S1, S2 ∈ Si, if x
S1
i > 0
then the following holds:
∑
e∈S1
le(xe) ≤
∑
e∈S2
le(xe). (1)
4 Variable delay mechanism
Given a congestion game (E, l,S, d) with non-negative, non-decreasing, contin-
uously differentiable and convex latency functions, we propose a coordination
mechanism which induces cost to players as follows:
Let N = (Ne)e∈E be a sequence of positive integers indexed by the set of
elements (edges) E to be called a batch system. A positive integer b ≤ Ne is
referred to as a batch index at edge e. The integer Ne is the number of batches
the flow at each e will be divided. Specifically at each edge e, the flow of any
player type through a path S such that e ∈ S, and consequently the total flow
xe through e, are divided into Ne equal batches. Now consider the following
functions, known as marginal-cost latency functions:
lˆe(xe) = le(xe) + l
′
e(xe) · xe, (2)
where l′e() is the derivative of le(). The latency induced to players at an edge e
is not going to be equal to all. Instead, flow of any player type and through any
path S at batch b receives latency lˆe((b/Ne)xe) per unit. Players are interested
in minimizing their own latency. Note that this assignment can be performed by
any desired policy, for example, randomly, first-come first-serve, by priority lists
etc. We will refer to the previous model of applying equal latency to all players
as the latencies or original model.
Since each batch b receives latency lˆe((b/Ne)xe) per unit, we define the cost
with respect to the batch system at an an edge with flow xe to be:
cˆe(xe) = (xe/Ne)
Ne∑
b=1
lˆe((b/Ne)xe)
and the social cost with respect to the batch system
Cˆ(x) =
∑
e
cˆe(xe).
Note that cˆe(xe) ≥
∫ xe
0 de(z)dz = le(xe)xe = ce(xe) which is the cost at edge
e as before; we do not decrease the cost as per the coordination mechanisms’
doctrine and as we shall see later, any cost increase can be made arbitrarily
small.
Definition 2. We say that the flow vector x is in equilibrium with respect to the
batch system if for all players i and for any pairs of strategies (paths) S1, S2 ∈ Si,
if xS1i > 0, then for any sequence of positive integers (batch indices) (be)e∈E such
that ∀e be ≤ Ne, the following holds:
∑
e∈S1
lˆe((be/Ne)xe) ≤
∑
e∈S2
lˆe(xe). (3)
Intuitively, if an atom changes path, then we assume that it gets to the last batch
of every new edge of the new path, and that under this assumption, there is no
strict gain in total per unit latency. Also, at an intuitive level, we assume that the
atoms of the flow are indistinguishable, so it makes sense to consider all possible
batch assignments along the edges of a path, i.e. even batch assignments where
an early batch in an edge in the beginning of a path is followed by a late batch in
the last edges of the path (if atoms were not indistinguishable, then there might
arise issues with the implementation policy on the batch assignments). We have
the following:
Lemma 1. The flow vector x is in equilibrium with respect to the batch system
iff it is in Wardrop equilibrium with respect to the marginal-cost latency functions
lˆe(xe) = le(xe)+ l
′
e(xe) ·xe, i.e. iff for all players i and for any pairs of strategies
(paths) S1, S2 ∈ Si, if x
S1
i > 0, then
∑
e∈S1
lˆe(xe) ≤
∑
e∈S2
lˆe(xe).
Proof. Since le() are convex, lˆe are non-decreasing. Because the inequality in
Definition 2 holds for any selection of batch indices, and therefore also for be =
Ne. The lemma easily follows. 
We now state the following well known facts derived from the literature [9].
Fact 1 When the latencies are non-negative, continuous and non-decreasing,
there always exists at least one Wardrop equilibrium.
Fact 2 If x and x′ are flow vectors in Wardrop equilibrium then le(xe)xe =
le(x
′
e)x
′
e for all edges e. This also shows a unique social cost for all Wardrop
equilibria.
Fact 3 A flow vector x in Wardrop equilibrium with respect to the marginal cost
latencies le(xe) + l
′
e(xe) · xe has a social cost C(x) with respect to the latency
functions le which is optimal.
We will now transfer these results in our variable delay batch setting.
Theorem 1. Under the variable delay mechanism, any batch system has a uni-
que equilibrium (as defined in Definition 2). Moreover, there is always a suitable
batch system whose cost, with respect to the batch system, when in equilibrium
(in the sense of Definition 2) is arbitrarily close to the optimal social cost of the
latencies model.
Proof. Indeed by the preceding Facts 1–3, and by Lemma 1, it suffices to prove
that if a flow x is in equilibrium with respect to a suitable batch system, then
its cost Cˆ(x) with respect to the batch system is arbitrarily close to the social
cost C(x) of the latencies model. This however is immediate to see since
cˆe(xe) = (xe/Ne)
Ne∑
b=1
lˆe((b/Ne)xe)
can be made arbitrarily close to
∫ xe
0
lˆe(z)dz = le(xe)xe = ce(xe)
by choosing for each e a large enough Ne. 
5 Discussion
Aside from the assumptions on the nature of the individual latency functions,
perhaps more interestingly, we require a mechanism that can allocate variable
cost at the flow within an edge and also “enforce” that anyone attempting to
switch strategies is “penalized” by getting the worst possible cost on his new
strategy.
In the context of road networks, these requirements could be implemented in
practice by traffic management tools such as traffic lights and access passes. Es-
pecially in a dynamic setting one could implement such mechanism by motivating
drivers to not deviate from their strategies with incentives (parking, passes, etc.)
that vest over time, as long as the driver’s strategy remains unchanged.
For applications in the computer or network domain, such a mechanism could
be implemented much easier by priorities at the software/hardware level. For
example in job scheduling, operating system priority handling could easily be
used while in network scheduling, packet switching at the router level could
satisfy our requirements.
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